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unpersuasive because the Duells made their demand more than thirty days
after their arraignment and failed to offer a valid excuse. If the Duells
wanted to challenge their indictment as vague, they should have made a
timely demand for a bill of particulars. Since they failed to do this, the
court held that the People's indictment was appropriate and the Duells'
appeal on this issue was without merit.
Second, the Duells claimed they had ineffective counsel. They argued
that their counsel's trial strategy was ineffective and therefore, was
prejudicial to their case. The court held that absent proof that the Duells
were actually prejudiced by their counsel's trial technique, their claim of
ineffective counsel was without merit. Therefore, finding both claims
without merit, the court affirmed the lower court judgment.
Sheela S. Parameswar
Cammon v. City of New York, 700 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999) (holding New York Labor Law's strict liability provisions were not
preempted by federal maritime law and that New York State had the right
to continue regulating safe construction practices in its navigable waters
concurrently with the application of the federal maritime law).
The plaintiff, Willie Cammon ("Cammon"), received injuries while
engaged in renovation and reconstruction work at the Hunts Point
Sanitation Department Transfer Station in New York. While Cammon
worked on a raft secured to a land-based structure, a passing tugboat
created turbulence shifting a crane bar and float stage. This caused a
timber to swing into Cammon and injured him. Cammon brought an action
against New York City, who owned the Hunts Point Station, and the
general contractor Anjac Enterprises, Inc. ("Defendants"). The trial court
granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to New York Labor
Law. In granting the motion, the trial court found that both New York
Labor Law causes of action were preempted by federal maritime
jurisdiction.
Cammon appealed the order granting the Defendant's motion to
dismiss to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division. This court granted
review to decide whether federal maritime law preempted New York Labor
Law.
The court stated that a party seeking to invoke Federal admiralty
jurisdiction must satisfy conditions of both location and connection with
maritime activity. In this case, repairing a pier adjacent to a navigable
waterway constituted traditional maritime activity governed by the
principles of Federal maritime law. Neither party disputed that the
accident occurred in navigable waters, or that Cammon had coverage and
received benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation
Act ("LHWCA").
The court referred to precedent which held that state law could be
preempted if either Congress evidenced an intent to occupy a field or if
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state law actually conflicted with federal law to the extent it stood as an
The court found neither of these
obstacle to Congress' objectives.
situations existed here. Thus, the court found no basis for refusing to
enforce New York's Labor Law in this case.
The court found that protecting workers employed in New York fell
within the state's historic police powers. Furthermore, the court noted that
the LHWCA only regulated the relationship between longshoremen/harbor
workers, their employers, and vessel owners. Congress did not regulate
rights or remedies outside of those relationships. Therefore, since the
LHWCA did not address claims by injured workers against third parties,
the court found no indication Congress intended to preclude application of
New York law to third-party claims against non-maritime defendants. In
addition, the court found no inconsistencies between the strict liability
provisions of the New York Labor Law and admiralty law. Therefore, the
strict liability provisions of the New York Labor Law were not preempted,
and the court reversed the order granting defendant's motion to dismiss.
Ryan 0. Reimers
In re Moores Lane Dev. Corp. v. Suffolk County Water Auth., 699
N.Y.S.2d 739 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that the county water
authority assumed the contractual obligation to provide water service to
developer when the authority purchased the water distribution system from
the village).
Pursuant to a contract, the Village of Greenport ("Village") agreed to
provide water to ninety-nine condominium units that petitioner's
In exchange for this service, the
predecessor intended to build.
predecessor agreed to pay $2570 per unit and any increases in hookup
charges that the Village imposed in future years. After the predecessor
built thirty-nine units, he sold the remaining property and assigned the
water contract to the petitioner, Moores Lane Development Corporation
("Moores Lane"). In 1994, the Village consented to the assignment and
demanded an additional $2162 per unit and a water up-front fee for the
remaining sixty units. The Village provided water to nineteen units as
Moores Lane built them. Subsequently, the Suffolk County Water
Authority ("SCWA") purchased the water distribution system outside the
Village boundaries. At that time, the Village and the SCWA denied
responsibility for supplying water to the remaining forty-one units.
Moores Lane commenced an action to compel either the Village or the
SCWA or both to supply water service. The Supreme Court of Suffolk
County directed the SCWA to supply water to Moores Lane's subdivision
and directed the Village to refund the sum of $88,642. The court also
directed Moores Lane to pay additional water hookup fees to the SCWA.
The issue on appeal was whether the SCWA assumed the obligation to
Moores Lane when it purchased the water distribution system from the
Village.

